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Recent Developments in Ohio's Charitable
Immunity Law
Crawford Morris*

T

at this problem together was in
January of 1957.1 At that time the Avellone decision,2 overruling nearly 50 years of Ohio law by making a hospital fully
liable for the torts of its servants under the doctrine of respondeat superior, was scarcely six months old. At that time we
3
observed:
This monumental decision raises two questions of extreme
importance which seem to be left unanswered and which
will unquestionably be the subject of further litigation.
Those questions are:
1. Is the scope of the Avellone decision limited solely to
hospitals or are all charities deprived of immunity?
2. Has Ohio adopted the New York Rule?
HE LAST TIME WE LOOKED

Time in its flight has brought us the answers to these two
questions, at least insofar as our Supreme Court is concerned.
And the answers furnished are illuminating not only for their
legal context but also for the insight they furnish us into the
inner workings of a Court's mental processes. Let us here reexamine each of these questions in turn.
Prologue: Hindsight is a wonderful thing. It teaches, if it
teaches anything, the truth of that old saying: "Only a fool
prognosticates the future." We note with some amusement (at
ourselves) that in 1957 we played the fool and ventured to
hazard a guess as to the ultimate answers time would bring to
both of these questions. 4 We also note that time has proved our
prognostications right on the first question and wrong on the
* Member of the firm of Arter, Hadden, Wykoff & Van Duzer of Cleveland,
Ohio. Formal education at Princeton University, Harvard Law School, Yale
University, Harvard Graduate School of Engineering, Mass. Inst. of Technology. Lecturer at the Graduate School of Nursing and Hospital Administration of Western Reserve University and University Hospitals of
Cleveland, St. Luke's Hospital, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland Clinical Society; etc. Defense counsel in the Avellone v. St. John's Hospital case.
1 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 47 (1957), Sequelae of Recent Hospital Tort LiabilityAvellone v. St. John's Hospital, Revisited.
2 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N. E. 2d 410 (1956).
3 See footnote 1, supra, at p. 47.
4 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 47 at p. 52 re question (1) and at p. 57 re question (2).
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second question-a "batting average" of just .500 which we
suppose is "about par for the course" of prognostication. But
like all lawyers we can easily distinguish our failure on the
second question for there the New York courts, whose rule Ohio
was seeming to follow, later reversed themselves and repudiated
their own rule, and Ohio, if it had even meant to adopt the New
York rule, promptly followed suit.
I. Charities Other Than Hospitals
Recapitulation: In presentation of the Avellone case to the
Supreme Court, both in brief and in oral argument, we had
warned that the Ohio immunity rule applied to all charities and
that any decision in the case at bar would logically extend to
affect all charities alike, many of whom were small struggling
organizations with very limited budgets. More specifically, the
experience of the State of Washington, 5 wherein its Supreme
Court found itself forced to retreat from its repudiation of the
immunity rule insofar as charities other than hospitals were
concerned, was called to the attention of the Ohio Supreme
Court as a reason for retaining the rather limited immunity in
favor of all charities rather than to attempt to repudiate it insofar as the instant defendant, a hospital, was concerned, with
the resultant loss of immunity for all other charities. Against
such a background, the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court, in
abolishing the tort immunity for the defendant hospital was, it
seemed to us, painstakingly careful to limit its language to the
single instance of a charitable hospital. It was this factor that
lead us to hazard our prognostication: 6 "It is the opinion of this
writer that our Supreme Court meant and will continue by
future decisions to limit the scope of the Avellone decision to the
sole instance of charitable hospitals."
This aspect of the problem presented itself to the Supreme
Court in 1960, in a case entitled Gibbon v. Y.W.C.A. 7 Like the
Avellone case, the Gibbon case came before the Supreme Court
solely on the pleadings. Petition alleged that plaintiff's decedent,
Jane Ann Gibbon, went to defendant Y.W.C.A.'s swimming pool
and there drowned due to defendant's life guard's neglect in
5 See 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 47 at pp. 48-50 for citation and decision of State
of Washington cases.
6 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 47 at p. 52.
7 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N. E. 2d 563.
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certain particulars. Defendant's demurrer to the petition claiming the charitable immunity was sustained by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals of Butler County reversed but certified
the record to the Supreme Court for conflict with the decision
of the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County in the similar case
of Tomasella v. St. Cecilia's Church.8 The Supreme Court of
Ohio reversed, and entered final judgment for the Y.W.C.A.,
holding in its syllabus:
1. A charitable or eleemosynary institution other than one
which has as its purpose the maintenance and operation of
a hospital, is, as a matter of public policy, not liable for
tortious injury except (1) when the injured person is not
a beneficiary of the institution, and (2) when a beneficiary
suffers harm as a result of failure of the institution to exercise due care in the selection or retention of an employee.
(Cullen v. Schmitt [1942], 139 Ohio St. 194, and Waddell,
a Minor v. Young Women's Christian Assn. [1938], 133
Ohio St. 601, approved and followed.)
2. In an action by an administrator to recover damages
under the wrongful death statute for the loss occasioned
by the drowning of the decedent in a swimming pool maintained and operated by the defendant, Young Women's
Christian Association, a charitable or eleemosynary institution, and allegedly caused by the negligence of an employee of the association, a demurrer to the petition filed
by the association was sustained, and final judgment was
entered by the Court of Common Pleas for the defendant,
which judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Held:
In the absence of facts establishing reasons for not applying a long-declared public policy, the doctrine of stare
decisis should be applied and followed in order to avoid
retroactive imposition of liability on such charitable institution which would result from the declaration of a
different public policy. Legislative policy in this matter
is committed to the General Assembly of Ohio which,
under Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, may
not enact retroactive laws or laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
It is interesting to note that the two reasons here assigned
by the Supreme Court for the retention of the older charitable
immunity rule insofar as charities other than hospitals are concerned notwithstanding the recent abolition of that rule by the
8 Affirmed without opinion by Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. For

opinion of trial court see 6 Ohio 0. 2d 508.
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same Court in the Avellone case insofar as charitable hospitals
are concerned, are: (1) stare decisis which avoids the unfairness
of retroactivity 9 and (2) the legislature which can consider in
committees all aspects of all charities and also avoid retroactivity.
Yet both of these points had been strenuously urged upon the
Supreme Court by the defense in the Avellone decision.' Why
had these same arguments fallen upon such deaf ears in 19561oa
in defense of a hospital and yet proved persuasive in 1960 in
favor of the Y.W.C.A.? The difference, we submit, lies not so

much in the different charitable undertakings of the two charitable defendants but in the time difference between the date of
the two opinions and the importance to the Supreme Court of

what had transpired in Ohio in the interim. For Courts are composed of judges, and judges are human beings. And elective
judges, if they wish to survive as judges must, of necessity, be
political human beings. And wise political human beings keep
an ear attuned to the groundswell of public opinion.
In 1956, a wave of judicial decisions was sweeping the country abolishing charitable immunity in state after state.

In

the

briefs filed on behalf of Avellone (by plaintiff and amicus
curiae) it was claimed that these decisions represented the majority view."
A careful analysis, however, showed that, while
increasing in number, such decisions were still a distinct minority, and some recent decisions had reaffirmed this doctrine
of charitable immunity. 12

Nonetheless, there seemed to be an

9 Recently we have had just such a situation: Accident in 1954 to a newborn. Charitable hospital trustees were then carrying relatively little insurance due to protection of charitable immunity law. 1955 child's attorney
decides not to sue due to charitable immunity. 1956 Avellone decision.
1958 Attorney decides, due to Avellone decision, to sue. Suit is filed against
the charitable hospital in an amount far exceeding the hospital's insurance
limits as they existed on day of accident in 1954 which is the only insurance available to the hospital although hospital had substantially increased
its insurance limits shortly after the Avellone decision and because of it.
10 Defendant's brief on the merits devoted no less than seven pages to
"stare decisis" and no less than 13 pages to "the legislature."
10a And yet prevailed back in 1936. See Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar, 131
Ohio St. 333, 2 N. E. 2d 857 at p. 343 where our Supreme Court in refusing
to disturb the charitable immunity doctrine said:
More than fourteen years have passed since this court declared that a
public charitable hospital is not liable unless it has failed to exercise
due care in the selection of its nurses, etc. We may well suggest, as
other courts have done, that our legislature could, if it wished, change
the law established by this court. It has not done so; it may not desire
to do so.
11 See briefs filed on behalf of Avellone and defendant's brief, p. 20.
12 See defendant's brief, pp. 19-23.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol10/iss3/5

4

10 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)

Sept., 1961

"aura" that abolishing the charitable immunity doctrine by judicial decree was the modern, progressive and popular thing to
do. With the exception of the previous judicial decisions offering
immunity and a few statutes granting charities certain corporate
and tax protection, Ohio had never clearly articulated its feelings of public policy towards charities. The Supreme Court,
therefore, had no expression of the people's will before it to
12
indicate the people's choice of a public policy toward charities. a
It had only the clamorings of those members of the plaintiff's
bar who had filed briefs on behalf of Avellone and who could
hardly be said to represent the public, having a vested interest
of their own to pursue. Accordingly, it felt free to redetermine
for itself just what it thought Ohio's public policy ought to be
concerning charitable hospitals, saying in its majority opinion: 1.3
Whatever the reason for the public policy that gave rise to
the rule of immunity, public policy today, examined in the
light of present day conditions, will not support such a rule.
Following the Avellone decision in 1956, the General Assembly took no steps in 1957. In 1959, however, substitute Senate Bill No. 241 was passed in the Senate by a vote of 29 to 1
and in the House by a vote of 93 to 32 to provide:
A nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital
purposes shall not be liable by reason of the acts of its
servants or agents for loss or damage arising from injury
to or death of a beneficiary to whatever degree of the works
or services of such nonprofit corporation * * * unless such

injuries or death are caused by the gross negligence of the
agents or servants of such corporation, etc.
The Governor vetoed the bill, stating in his message:
I am motivated in this veto with the need for the protection
of the individual who was injured by the acts of the agent
of the aforestated groups and whose injury may be so extreme as to deprive him of being able to earn a livelihood
regardless of whether the negligence which lead up to the
injury was gross or de minimus.
165 Ohio St. 467, at p. 476.
This alone would seem to contra-indicate the abolition of a judicial doctrine of fifty years standing by retroactive court decree in a single case
presenting only one narrow issue raised by the pleadings, whereas the
legislature could hear from all groups and formulate a non-retroactive rule
based upon the considered problems of all.
12a
13
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The Senate repassed the bill by a vote of 25 to 4 but in the
House the affirmative vote of 64 to 22 for repassage failed to obtain the constitutional requirement of % of the members, 14 so
the bill failed.
Thus, in 1960 when the Supreme Court is faced once again
with the task of formulating a public policy for the people of
Ohio towards charities, it finds not a background "aura" of
popularity against charitable immunity but instead a raging conflict among the people themselves as to just what their policy towards charities is to be. Some groups, through their legislators,
are clamoring for overthrow of the Avellone decision and restoration of at least some immunityl 4 a to all charities including
hospitals. Others, through their Governor, seek to reaffirm the
Avellone decision. The legislature almost overrides the Governor's veto. The public policy of the people of Ohio toward
charities is not so simple a thing in 1960 as it appeared to be
in 1956. It now has virulent political overtones. The Supreme
Court now feels that this is a matter solely for the legislature.
It declines, in 1960, to extend to charities other than hospitals
that same reasoning it felt public policy required toward hospitals in 1956. In its majority opinion, after exhaustively reviewing the political history of SB 241, as hereinabove set forth, our
Supreme Court said: 15
This recent legislative development is portrayed for the sole
purpose of indicating the conftict of opinion presently existing in the legislative process of our state government.
Defendant's question raises the further important question
of whether changes in public policy in this field should be
judiciously or legislatively declared. The power of the court
to revise previously declared rules of public policy is unquestioned but the advisability of exercising such power
presents the problem. Revision of an established policy
should be made only when compelling reasons are set forth
as in the Avellone case. The majority of this court are of
the opinion that similar compelling reasons have not been
established in this case.
14 We are told the failure was due solely to the fact that by that time many
of the legislators had returned home.
14a It is interesting to note that S. B. 241 while it grants hospitals some of
the immunity abolished by the Avellone decision, does not restore hospitals

to that immunity enjoyed by hospitals prior to the Avellone decision; i.e.,
pre-Avellone liability of hospital to patient only for administrative negligence or negligent selection or retention of employee; S. B. 241 liability
only for gross negligence of employees.
15 170 Ohio St. 280 at p. 286 and at p. 288. Emphasis ours.
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If there is to be a change in our policy and law let the legislature do it after full hearings at which the representatives
of all communities and charities affected may be heard. If
public liability demands it the legislature can act as it did
in enacting Section 4515.02 Revised Code limiting the liability the driver owes to his guest passenger. 16
In the Avellone case the court felt the changed modern
operating conditions of a nonprofit hospital required it to
reject and abandon the previous declared public policy.
Similarly compelling reasons are not established to the satisfaction of the majority in this case particularly in the light
of the recent legislative developments recited herein showing the conflict of views in the area of charitable immunity
or liability. Therefore, we decline to again declare an extension or modification of public policy. We feel that under
these circumstances the doctrine of stare decisis should be
applied and followed in order, if for no other reason, to
avoid retroactive imposition of liability on a charitable institution which would result from the declaration of a different public policy-and we hold accordingly. Any legislative enactment declaring a different policy could only be
prospective in its operation.
The logical inconsistency of abolishing charitable immunity
for hospitals but retaining it for all other charities warned
against in the dissenting opinion in the Avellone case 17 and in a
concurring opinion in the Gibbon case itself,' was dismissed by
the majority opinion on the basis of the State of Washington
cases: 19
Thus Washington now has the rule of ordinary negligence
applied to charitable hospitals but still follow the rule of
limited immunity as applied to other charitable institutions.
16 Exactly our argument to the Supreme Court in the Avellone case.
17 165 Ohio St. 467 at p. 479, Putnam J. dissenting:
This has been a principle of Ohio law since 1911. Although the instant
case involves the liability of a charitable hospital, it can be seen from
the above quotation that the same rule applies to all public charitable
institutions. The defendant in its brief lists about one hundred charitable activities in Cleveland alone which participate financially in the
Welfare Federation of Cleveland. There must be thousands of them
in the state of Ohio. Included among them are the Boy Scouts, Girl
Scouts, Salvation Army, Young Men's Christian Association, Young
Women's Christian Association, various homes for the aged sponsored
and kept up by various groups, various institutions for delinquent or
dependent children, etc. All these are vitally affected by this decision.
It cannot logically be circumscribed to be applicable to hospitals alone.
18 170 Ohio St. 280 at p. 296, Bell, J. concurring:
I can come to no conclusion other than that of Judge Putnam who, in
dissenting in the Avellone case, said that the rule of the Avellone case
"cannot logically be circumscribed to be applicable to hospitals alone."
19 170 Ohio St. 280 at p. 287.
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This inconsistency, however, was highlighted by one judge 19 a
who in a separate opinion in the Gibbon case but speaking for
two other judges 19b as well as himself said: 19c
I can not, however, agree to the recognition of one rule for
a charitable institution that operates a hospital and the
perpetuation of a contrary rule for a charitable institution
that does not.
In my opinion, the 'long-declared public policy' mentioned
in the majority opinion herein was abandoned in the
Avellone case in favor of another. If stare decisis means
anything, then the latest ruling made by five members of
this court in the Avellone case should be recognized as an
example of that doctrine * * *
* * * When a foundation is removed, a structure which

had been erected thereon ordinarily collapses. I can come
to no conclusion other than that of Judge Putnam who, in
dissenting in the Avellone case, said that the rule of the
Avellone case "cannot logically be circumscribed to be applicable to hospitals alone."
In a separate concurring opinion 20 one other Judge evidently seeks to harmonize the Gibbon case with the Avellone
case on the basis of the extent of the "payment" by the beneficiary, saying that in the Gibbon case the 35 cents paid by plaintiff's decedent was not a substantial equivalent for the benefits
sought from the charity and therefore she was not a "paying"
beneficiary whereas in the Avellone case Avellone was a "paying" patient and a charity should have less liability to a "nonpaying" patient than to a "paying" patient. With this reasoning
2oa
we cannot agree.
Our Supreme Court has never made such a distinction in
any of its charitable immunity cases and, in fact, has specifically
repudiated any such distinction. Thus, in the first decision creating the charitable immunity doctrine in 1911,20b our Supreme
19a Bell J. concurring in the judgment solely on the ground that the petition

was insufficient to state a cause of action.
19b Zimmerman and Matthias JJ.
19c At pp. 295-6. Emphasis by the court.
20 Taft, J. at pp. 294-5.
20a While there may be some analogy in the law of gratuitous bailment,
licensee, social guest, etc. for such a distinction, as suggested by J. Taft
neither the Avellone nor the Gibbon decisions were based on any such
ground.
20b Taylor v. Protestant Hospital, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N. E. 1089 (1911).
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Court specifically held as against a paying patent: 20C
1. The fact that a public charitable hospital receives pay
from a patient for lodging and care does not affect its
character as a charitable institution, nor its rights or liabilities as such in relation to such a patient.
2. A public charitable hospital organized as such and open
to all persons although conducted under private management is not liable for injuries to a patient of the hospital resulting from the negligence of a nurse employed by it.
In its opinion the Supreme Court said: 20d
We think this hospital owned and operated in the manner
set out is a public charity and this without reference to
whether some of the patients are what are termed pay patients or not.
"The fact that its funds are supplemented by such amounts
as it may receive, from those who are able to pay wholly or
entirely for the accommodation they receive, does not render
it the less a public charity. All sums thus obtained are
held upon the same trust as those which are the gifts of
pure benevolence."
While allowing recovery in favor of a paying patient for the
negligent selection of a nurse, the Supreme Court in 192220e
again repudiated any distinction between a paying and a nonpaying beneficiary of the charity, saying in its opinion: 20f
In our day there is a general tendency in all persons to resort to hospitals in cases which require surgical operations,
or in cases of severe sickness and for obvious reasons it is
desirable that such an institution should not be held out
as devoted solely either to the poor or to the rich, and the
degree of care required should in all cases be the same. The
same rule should apply to a pay patient as to one who does
not pay, and there is general agreement on this proposition.
In a case 20 9 almost identical with the Gibbon case, the Supreme Court in 1938 denied recovery without making any such
distinction, and even saying in its opinion: 20h
20c
20d

Ibid. Syllabus.
Ibid at p. 98 and p. 99. Emphasis ours.

20e Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E.
287 (1922).
20f Ibid at p. 74; Emphasis ours.
20g Waddell v. Y. W. C. A., 133 Ohio St. 601; 15 N. E. 2d 140 (1938).
20h Ibid at pp. 604-605. Emphasis ours.
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Charity is not aid to the needy alone, but it embraces and
includes all which aids man and seeks to improve his condition. Diffusion of useful knowledge, the acquirement of
the knowledge of arts and sciences and the advancement of
learning without any particular reference to the poor are
considered charitable objects.
Furthermore, in the Avellone case, Avellone never did pay
his bill and had to be sued by the hospital for it, which suit
was followed by the malpractice case of Avellone against the
hospital, and the record is silent as to whether or not Jane
Gibbon's .350 admission fee was a more "substantial equivalent"
in terms of the total cost of maintaining the Y.W.C.A. swimming pool allocated among the number of persons swimming
there than was Avellone's (non-payment of his) bill2l in relation

to the total cost of hospital administration. It may well be that
hers was the more "substantial equivalent" on a per person
unit basis, notwithstanding its lower monetary amount.
As we view this problem, there should be no difference between a "paying" and a "nonpaying" patient for no matter how
much is paid by a "paying" patient to a charity, that payment
never begins to be a substantial equivalent to the benefits received, i.e., the college student's tuition doesn't begin to pay for
what the college pays out of its general endowment fund to
educate him. In this sense all beneficiaries of charitable institutions are, at best, but quasi-paying beneficiaries, or, to view
the matter the other way, all are quasi-dependents.
Sequelae: While in the Gibbon case the Supreme Court
answered our problem of whether the Avellone decision applied
to charities other than hospitals by holding that it does not, in
a later case it limited the scope of the Gibbon case somewhat.
Thus in Blankenship v. Alter, Archbishop Trustee,2 2 St. Joseph's
Church, to raise money for the church, regularly conducted a
bingo game open to the public and attended by some 1,500 players. Plaintiff who was not a member of the church attended the
game solely to play bingo and attempt to win money and was
injured when she sat on a metal chair which was defective and
collapsed. Plaintiff sued the church for her injuries. In the trial
court plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment. The Court of
It should be noted that even where paid the average patient does not pay
the cost of the bill but only the cost of the Blue Cross insurance premium.
22 171 Ohio St. 65; 167 N. E. 2d 922 (1960).
21
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Appeals affirmed the judgment but certified the case as in con23
flict with the case of Tomasella v. St. Cecilia's Church.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of plaintiff, holding in its syllabus:
1. Immunity from civil liability for negligence accorded to
charitable institutions, including religious organizations, depends upon the actual devotion of the institution to charitable purposes. And a charitable institution is liable for negligence in the operation of a business enterprise for profit
not directly related to the purposes of which the institution
was organized.
2. A church in conducting a game of chance on its premises
for a substantial profit is engaged in a business enterprise
and is amenable to a tort action by a patron of the game
who sustained personal injuries by a fall when a defective
chair supplied by the church in connection with the game
collapsed.
In its opinion the Supreme Court said: 23a
It might be that this case could be decided on the basis that
plaintiff was a stranger to any religious or charitable ministrations of St. Joseph's Church * * * However, we prefer

to place our decision on a somewhat broader ground.
Immunity from civil liability for negligence accorded to
charitable institutions, including religious organizations, depends upon the actual devotion of the institution to charitable purposes, and a charitable institution is liable for
negligence in the operation of a business enterprise for profit
not directly related to the purpose for which such institution
was organized. * * *
* * * By conducting a business enterprise of the kind described, * * * the church stepped out of its ordinary and

accepted sphere and thereby lost the immunity from tort liability it might have asserted in different circumstances.
Comment: Evidently this is a matter of the degree of the
business involved.

Compare Cullen v. Schmit 24 wherein re-

covery was denied plaintiff for injury sustained in a fall on the
stairs of a church where she was going after attending the
church services to attend the sale of religious articles in the
basement of the church on the grounds that she was a beneficiary
of the church religious services and the sale of the religious
articles in the basement was not a commercial enterprise but
See footnote 8, sutpia.
23a 171 Ohio St. 65 at pp. 66-67.
23

24

139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N. E. 2d 146.
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was held following and in connection with the religious service
of the church.
This non-hospital charitable institution aspect of the problem has been further confused by the very recent per curiam
2
opinion of a divided court in Bell v. The Salvation Army. 4Ia
Here amended petition in the Cleveland Municipal Court alleged:
* * * defendants * * * operate a hotel * * * for profit and
conduct a business * * * for profit and invite the general
public as patrons * * * Plaintiff states * * * he was a
patron * * * of the hotel * * * that he paid valuable considerations for the privilege of using and staying at said
hotel * * * and was assaulted by defendant's employees
Defendant's demurrer to this was sustained by the Municipal
Court and the Court of Appeals on the grounds of the charitable
immunity. Motion to certify was allowed by the Supreme Court
which reversed and remanded for trial. In its per curiam opinion
of reversal, the majority of the Supreme Court said: 24b
There are at least three exceptions to the doctrine of immunity for nonhospital charitable institutions, to wit; (1)
where the injured person is not a beneficiary of the institution (Gibbon, Admr. v. Y.W.C.A., 170 Ohio St., 280, 164
N. E. 2d 563; Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N. E. 2d
146); (2) where a beneficiary suffers harm as a result of
the failure of the institution to exercise due care in the
selection or retention of an employee (Waddell, a minor v.
Y.W.C.A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N. E. 2d 140; Cullen v.
Schmit, supra); and (3) where the institution operates a
business enterprise for profit not directly related to the purposes for which such institution was organized (Blankenship v. Alter, Archbishop, Trustee, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167
N. E. 2d 922). Of course, one who deals with business enterprise is a nonbeneficiary of the charitable institution under
exception number [1] also.
A plaintiff, therefore, may state a cause of action against a
charitable nonhospital institution by alleging facts which
raise a reasonable inference that one or more of the exceptions to the immunity doctrine exist. Is such inference
raised from the facts alleged in the amended petition here
in issue?
172 Ohio St. 326 (decided June 14, 1961) per curiam opinion concurred
in by Zimmerman, Taft, Matthias and Bell JJ.; Weygandt, C.J., Radcliff
and O'Neill JJ., dissenting.
24b Ibid at pp. 328-329.
24a
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May it reasonably be inferred that plaintiff is a non-beneficiary of the institution under exception number [1], supra?
The plaintiff alleges simply that he paid a 'valuable consideration' for his lodging. We hold that such allegation
sufficiently raises the issue of whether plaintiff paid or was
obligated to pay a fee for his accommodation which was
substantially equivalent to the benefit he was to receive
from such accommodation. If plaintiff was obligated to or
did pay a sum of money to the defendant which sum was
substantially commensurate to the benefits he was to receive,
he was a nonbeneficiary of the institution so far as the
transaction here in question is concerned. Whether such
sum paid by plaintiff was in fact substantially equivalent to
the benefits conferred may depend upon numerous facts,
i.e., the actual amount of the sum paid, the nature and
character of the accommodation, the obligation to pay, the
cost of accommodations in hotels of similar character, the
purpose of the operation of the business enterprise, etc. In
other words, the status of the plaintiff will depend upon the
evidence adduced at the trial. We have no way of forecasting what the evidence may be. We hold simply that the
allegation of payment of a 'valuable consideration,' under
the facts of this case, sufficiently raises the issue of the status
of the plaintiff in relation to the institution. * * *
Clearly the theory of plaintiff's case is not founded on exception number (2), supra, relating to negligence in the
selection of employees. Consequently, we turn now to a consideration of exception number (3), supra, to wit, are facts
alleged which raise a reasonable inference that defendant
was operating a business enterprise for profit not reasonably
related to the purpose for which such institution was organized? * * * Again, in ruling upon a demurrer, a court

may take judicial notice of the fact that one function of the
Salvation Army includes providing temporary sleeping
quarters for indigents and other persons of unfortunate circumstances. However, a court may not extend that observation to mean that every hotel operated by such organization is operated for such nonprofit reasons. There is
nothing to prevent such an organization from operating for
investment purposes or otherwise, a hotel for profit. In short,
whether the hotel in question was operated for profit and
whether its function was directly related to the purpose for
which the Salvation Army was organized are matters of
proof from evidence to be submitted at the trial of this
cause.
That part of this per curiam opinion which deals with exceptions (2) and (3) would seem to be correct, (2) not being involved and (3) logically following from the Blankenship case for
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if the Salvation Army was running this particular hotel for the
purpose of making a profit then it was not acting as a dispenser
of charity in so doing and plaintiff, as a patron therein would not
be a beneficiary of a charitable function of defendant at the time
complained of and therefore fully entitled to maintain his suit
against defendant insofar as a demurrer is concerned.
That part of this per curiam opinion dealing with exception
(1), however, gives us considerable trouble. If the Supreme
Court means to imply by its statement of exception (1) that the
Gibbon case and the Cullen case involved a non-beneficiary
plaintiff who was permitted to recover from a non-hospital
charity, the Supreme Court is in error. Plaintiff's decedent in
the Gibbon case and plaintiff in the Cullen case were both beneficiaries of the charitable defendant involved and neither suit
was allowed to be maintained against the defendant charity.
However, in each case, the syllabus does state that a non-beneficiary plaintiff in a proper case could maintain a suit against
a charity. In other words while the Ohio law is that "(1) where
the injured person is not a beneficiary of the institution" he may
sue the non-hospital charitable institution, neither the Gibbon
case nor the Cullen case involved a non-beneficiary. The point
is important because in its discussion of exception (1) the Supreme Court seems to adopt the reasoning asserted in a concurring opinion in the Gibbon case with which we are in com24
plete disagreement as previously discussed herein. c
In the Gibbon case, this concurring opinion sought to distinguish the Avellone decision (hospital liable to a beneficiary
for the negligence of the servants) from the Gibbon decision
(Y.W.C.A. not liable to a beneficiary for the negligence of its
servants) on the grounds that Avellone had paid or was obligated to pay a sum of money "substantially equivalent" to the
benefits conferred upon him by the charity whereas Jane Gibbon had paid a sum lesser than this and, therefore, the hospital
must respond to Avellone whereas the Y.W.C.A. need not respond to Jane Gibbon, although, as we have discussed earlier
in this article, the two decisions themselves were not based upon
any such theory nor did the record indicate that such magnitude
of payments were true in fact. Here the Supreme Court seems
to be embracing this reasoning on the ground that if plaintiff can
prove he made a payment "substantially equivalent to the bene24C See footnote

20, supra.
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fits conferred" by the charity, he then ceases to be a beneficiary
and becomes a non-beneficiary by that fact alone. We cannot
accept this argument for two reasons: first, theoretical; if the
defendant is pursuing its charitable function in conferring the
benefit on the plaintiff (desired by the plaintiff) its non-liability
status should remain the same regardless of whether or not the
payment for the benefit by the plaintiff is less than, equal to or
greater than the value of the benefit conferred 25 and conversely,
if the defendant is pursuing a business profit function in conferring the benefit on the plaintiff its liability status (under existing case law) should not be altered by the value of the payment even if the plaintiff paid nothing for the benefit conferred
as is often the case; second, practical; the determination of
whether or not a given beneficiary-plaintiff's payment is "substantially equivalent to" the value of the benefit conferred upon
him by the charity would seem to be so difficult an economic
theory and accounting problem as to render any rule dependent
thereon completely unworkable and impracticable as a basis for
the imposition or non-imposition of legal liability.
II. Has Ohio Adopted "The New York Rule"?
Recapitulation: In its numerous decisions upholding the doctrine of charitable immunity over its nearly fifty year period of
existence, the Supreme Court of Ohio had based its reasoning
upon the fact that charities are "masters different from others."
The difference lies in the fact that the fundamental basis on
which rests the harsh doctrine of respondeat superior, which
imposes upon one the responsibility for the acts of another, is
the right to control the details of the manner and method of the
work performed. In the case of charities and especially of hospitals, such right to control is considerably diminished by the
fact that the servant is either a volunteer worker or a professional person such as a nurse, or intern who, as a practical
matter, is more apt to follow her own theories and training in
carrying out her professional duties, or else to obey the exacting
orders of the doctor in charge of the case, than the routine orders
of the hospital. In an age of specialization, with the necessity of
increasing reliance upon independent experts, the reason for the
rule seems more valid than ever before. All of this was careSee footnote 20b-20h, supra, citing and discussing 85 Ohio St. 90, 104
Ohio St. 61 and 133 Ohio St. 601 to this effect.
25
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fully presented to the Supreme Court in the Avellone case with
the appeal that the immunity should be retained. However,
there was a danger inherent in such an argument which was
foreseen and also presented to the Supreme Court. That danger
was that a compromise be effected whereby the charity be
granted immunity for those acts of its servants over which it did
not have, as a practical matter, the full right of control possessed
by a normal employer, but that it be held liable for all acts of
its servants where it possessed such full right of control. In
the case of the hospital this would mean that any act of a nurse
which was not a carrying out of her professional duties, but was
merely a routine administrative act, would render the hospital
liable if negligently performed, but that any act in the performance of her professional duties would not render the hospital
liable, no matter how negligently performed. This is the New
York rule.2 0

While logically appealing as a workable compro-

mise, it had proved in fact to be extremely illogical, unworkable
and to lead to an enormous amount of litigation benefiting no
one but the legal profession, and adding to the ever-growing
volume of litigation clogging our court dockets.2 7 All of this was
brought to the attention of our Supreme Court in the Avellone
case, with an urgent appeal that Ohio not adopt the New York
rule with its confusing borderline refinements.
The majority opinion in the Avellone decision, in reaching
its conclusion, stated:
We, thus, conclude that a corporation not for profit, which
has as its purpose the maintenance and operation of a hospital, is, under the doctrine of respondeat superior (and
the various rules and exceptions applicable thereto), liable
for the torts of its servants, * * *

and then went on to say:
and leave for future determination the application of this
doctrine to the facts of the instant case as may be proved
on trial. For instance, we are not deciding that persons
working in a hospital such as doctors and nurses, under circumstances where the hospital has no authority or right of
control over them, can bind the hospital by their negligent
actions. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,
211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 505.
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92
(1914); See 25 A. L. R. 2d 29 at p. 170.
27 See 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 47 at pp. 54-56.
26
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When this language was considered in the light of the briefs
and oral arguments presented to the Supreme Court, the question arose as to whether or not the Supreme Court of Ohio was
adopting the New York rule.
It was our opinion 28 in 1957 based upon the above quoted
language from the Avellone decision that our Supreme Court
meant to adopt and apply the New York rule. However, later
in 1957 the New York Court of Appeals abolished the New York
rule by specifically overruling Schloendorff v. Society of New
29'
York Hospital in the case of Bing v. Thunig.
The following year the case of Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital of Youngstown3 0 reached the Supreme Court of Ohio. This
case involved the death of a patient after an operation allegedly
due to the negligence of the anesthetist during the operation.
The anesthetist, a graduate of Rome, Italy, was licensed to practice in Italy but not in Ohio and was employed by the defendant hospital first as an intern and later, and at the time of the
operation in question, as a resident in anesthesia on the hospital
staff. Concerning the anesthetist's status at the time in question,
the Supreme Court said: 31
since the anesthetist was not licensed as a physician in Ohio,
it would be possible to consider him as any other medical
employee and avoid the problems hereinafter listed. However, in order to meet head-on a problem which has been
inevitable since the decision in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N. E. 2d 410, we prefer to consider the anesthetist as if he were a physician licensed to
practice medicine in Ohio and on the staff of a hospital as a
resident physician. Review of the record in this case reveals
sufficient disparity in the evidence to warrant submitting a
question of liability to jury, and sufficient credible evidence
to support the verdict returned by the jury.
In affirming 3 2 the judgment of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals entered on the jury verdict for plaintiff, the
Supreme Court said: 33

30

6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 47 at p. 57.
2 N. Y. 715, 143 N. E. 2d 3 (decided May 16, 1957).
170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N. E. 2d 765 (decided April 20, 1960).

31

Ibid at p. 520.

28
29

The Supreme Court also held that the 2 year wrongful death statute of
limitations provided by R. C. 2125.02 and not the 1 year malpractice statute
of limitations provided by R. C. 2305.11 governed this wrongful death action
based upon alleged malpractice.
33 170 Ohio St. 467 at pp. 525-527. Emphasis added.
32
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In the Avellone case * * * this court held that a corporation
not for profit which has for its purpose the maintenance and
operation of a hospital is, under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, liable for the torts of its servants. Specifically reserved from that decision, however, was the question
whether "persons working in a hospital such as doctors and
nurses under circumstances where the hospital has no authority or right of control over them can bind the hospital
by their negligent actions." A similar reservation must, of
course, be made here.
The leading case in this country which held that there
was immunity for the "medical" acts of hospital employees
was Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y.
125, 105 N. E. 92. * * * That case, however, was specifically
overruled by the New York Court of Appeals and Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N. Y. 765; 143 N. E. 2d 3.
Following the adoption of the Schloendorff rule, a series of
cases in New York alone clearly demonstrated the unworkability of any rule which attempts to distinguish between
"medical" acts and "administrative" acts. * * *

Recognizing this inconsistency, the New York Court in the
opinion by Judge Fuld in the Bing case, supra, the reasoning of which we find compelling in our judgment herein,
said:
"hospitals should in short, shoulder the responsibilities
borne by everyone else. There is no reason to continue
their exemption from the universal rule of respondeat superior. The test should be for these institutions, whether
charitable or profit-making, as it is for every other employer, was the person who committed the negligent injury-producing act, one of its employees, and if he was,
was he acting within the scope of his employment."
The nature of the act done, whether it is administrative or
medical, cannot justify a difference in the legal theory of
liability. The test should be, simply, was the act done performed in the service of the employer, and was the act done
in the scope and course of the employee's duty. Obviously,
such a test will, so far as a hospital is concerned, relieve
from, or subject to, liability in exactly the same manner
and according to the same rules as any other employer is
relieved or "subjected."
The syllabus reads in part as follows:
2. A corporation not for profit, which has as its purpose the
maintenance and operation of a hospital, is, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, liable for the negligent acts
of its employees, irrespective of whether those acts are administrative or medical.
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Conclusion
It is now almost five years3 4 since our Supreme Court announced its decision in the Avellone case. During these five
years, the two problems created by the Avellone decision have,
like "Mother Carrie's chickens" "come home to roost." Our Supreme Court has resolved each in turn, one in favor of charitable
immunity for all charitable institutions except those that have
the misfortune to run hospitals, the other further against hospitals for all acts of all servants.
However, this matter does not seem to be yet resolved. As
the Supreme Court observed in its Gibbon decision, this is a
matter for the legislature. It is indeed! In 1961 the Ohio Legislature, undaunted by the Governor's veto of S. B. 241 in 1959,
reenacted S. B. 241 into S. B. 187. 35 The legislative history of
S. B. 187 shows stormy progress: 36 passed by the Senate by a
substantial margin; opposed vigorously in the House by leading
plaintiffs' attorneys and reportedly even by a plaintiff-attorneys
association's paid lobbyist, 37 it failed to pass the House by 5
votes, was called for reconsideration by the House and then
passed by a modest margin. As this article "goes to press" this
bill lays on the Governor's desk awaiting signature into law38
or veto. The prognosticators are prognosticating a veto.
This time we decline to prognosticate.
[Editor'sNote: On June 30th, Governor DiSalle vetoed S. B. 187. His veto
message was substantially the same as his veto message in 1959 regarding
S. B. 241.]
34 The Avellone case was decided July 18, 1956.
35 S. B. 187 would seem to raise "Mother Carrie's chickens" of its own:
(1) while it restores hospitals to some measure of immunity making them
liable only for gross negligence of their servants, it reduces all other

charitable institutions to the same status, thus overruling the immunity
granted such other charities by the Gibbon case and earlier cases (Cullen

v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194; Waddell v. Y. W. C. A., 133 Ohio St. 601) (2) it
creates a legal concept relatively new to Ohio law-namely "gross negligence" which will require further judicial decision to define (and to differentiate from wanton misconduct, an already well defined but somewhat
obscure legal concept); (3) it renders charities liable solely in the event of
gross negligence on the part of its servants, therefore there would seem to
be no liability for acts of hospital servants of a nature greater than gross
negligence such as intentional or willful acts or even wanton misconduct,

which would seem to include assault and battery, operations without consent, etc.
36 Senate: passed by vote of 28 to 9 on April 11, 1961; House: 65 votes for
but 70 needed-reconsidered and passed by vote of 78 to 50 on June 15, 1961.
37 Cleveland Press-May 18, 1961, page B-14, Cols. 1 and 2:
A well-heeled lobby has appeared on the Columbus scene to fight the
proposal to give charitable institutions immunity from suits over acts
of their employees. The lobby is being financed by The Ohio Chapter
of the National Association of Claimants Attorneys.
38 Cleveland Press-June 16, 1961, page B-6, Col. 1.
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